

25 March 1948

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Subject: Meeting of SANACC Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare

1. A special meeting of the SANACC Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare met at 1100 today, Thursday, 25 March 1948, to discuss certain suggestions offered by the Air Force on paper 304/12. The following members were present:

Chairman - Mr. Ralph Block	- State Department
Capt. Karl Fehlmann	- Navy Department
Comdr. David Knoll	- Navy Department
Colonel Clyde Rich	- Air Force
Colonel William McNamee	- Army Department
	- CIA

2. The Chairman initially raised the question as to whether the suggested alterations should be made by the Subcommittee and issued in a paper which would be substituted for the present 304/12, or whether the changes were such as could be effected by SANACC. Mr. Block then turned the meeting over to Colonel Rich.

3. Colonel Rich stated that Mr. Cornelius Whitney, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, was very pleased with the organizational presentation for the proposed National Security Information Agency. He had two suggestions to offer which he felt would strengthen the paper and which he felt would expedite its approval by SANACC. His goal of endeavor was to have the changes made, have each of the members of the Subcommittee sell the paper and its contents to their pertinent SANACC members and then get speedy action in a matter of days by SANACC.

4. The two suggestions offered by Mr. Whitney through Colonel Rich were:

a. A restatement of THE PROBLEM, which now reads: "To provide a plan for a National Wartime Psychological Warfare organization which may be used as a basis for further planning" to read "To provide outline plan for a National Wartime Psychological Warfare organization to function in time of war, or threat of war, as may be determined by the President." Mr. Whitney contended that his suggested alteration would strengthen the PROBLEM statement.

b. Under THE RECOMMENDATIONS, c reads that the paper after approval by SANACC should be forwarded to the National Security Council, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Air Force.

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Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director, Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. Whitney suggested that this be changed to read "After approval this paper be forwarded to the National Security Council for approval and appropriate action."

5. Since at this stage of the discussion it looked like a new paper was about to be issued, I told the Chairman that I had two suggestions which would improve the paper - one to clarify the position of the JCS and the second to give the reason why the Deputy for Intelligence in the proposed NSIA was kept separate from the Deputy for Plans and Operations. The Committee members felt that both views would improve the paper.

6. At this point, however, something happened which changed the whole complexion of the discussion. Captain Poehlmann stated that he had some changes to offer also and his suggestions would have altered many of the charts and explanatory notes as they are now prepared. It was indeed unfortunate that Captain Poehlmann offered such lengthy and somewhat murky changes because many of the Committee members felt that to issue these together with what had already been presented would have had a tendency to weaken the entire presentation.

7. Thus it was that the view was expressed by Colonel McNamara that perhaps the most speedy way to get approval on the paper would be to let the document stand as it is with its present shortcomings and allow SANACC to make the changes if the changes were deemed necessary.

8. Colonel Rich was obviously displeased with the manipulations of Captain Poehlmann and said that since the Air Force's suggested changes apparently set off chain reaction with many other views being offered by other agencies, he was withdrawing his points and was going to report to Mr. Whitney that the Subcommittee had not accepted his recommendations and that the best solution was to call an early SANACC meeting.


9. The feeling that I could clarify the atmosphere and tactically get Captain Poehlmann to withdraw his views, I told the Subcommittee that the two points which I had raised were injected only on the assumption that a new paper was being issued; that they were not offered as justification for a new paper and furthermore if adding them we complicated Colonel Rich's presentation then I withdrew them immediately. Captain Poehlmann did follow the example and withdrew his suggested changes and at that stage it looked like we might be able to get a corrected paper issued incorporating the viewpoints of Mr. Whitney. However, our hopes were short lived.

10. Captain Poehlmann would not agree to changing the wording of the statements of THE PROBLEM. We attempted to show him that nothing was lost by dropping the words "which may be used as a basis for further planning" since in paragraph 6 of the DISCUSSION we indicate that after

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approval of the plan by SANACC the Subcommittee will do further work to develop the organizational outline presented in the paper. Try as we may, we couldn't change the Captain so the meeting adjourned.

11. At a subsequent luncheon with Colonels Rich and McKamee, Colonel Rich expressed himself as quite peeved with the actions of the Navy member of the Subcommittee and after discussion of this meeting with Mr. Whitney he may make another effort at the meeting to be held tomorrow morning (Friday, 26 March) to get Mr. Whitney's ideas incorporated in a corrected paper, if Mr. Whitney so desires.



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